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ESSAY
WHAT THE HEIN DECISION CAN TELL US
ABOUT THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Carl H. Esbeck*
The United States Supreme Court handed down its much-
anticipated decision in Hein v. Freedom From Religion
Foundation' on June 25, 2007, in the final week before summer
recess. This is the first case involving church-state relations to
come before the Supreme Court with the two newest Justices in
place, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Additionally, in
this and other cases, Justice Kennedy was being closely watched
to see if he would move to a "new middle" since Justice O'Connor
is no longer on the Court. There were no church-state cases on
the docket for the 2007 Term, and Hein could prove to be the
last word on Establishment Clause matters for some time.2
* R.B. Price Professor and Isabelle Wade & Paul C. Lyda Professor of Law, University of
Missouri.
1 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (plurality opinion).
2 On March 31, 2008, the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari
in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (2008). The case will be argued
during the Court's 2008 Term. The record in Pleasant Grove presents an interesting
issue concerning how to distinguish private religious speech from government religious
speech. The Free Speech Clause is relevant only if the expression is private religious
speech, whereas the Establishment Clause is of relevance only if the expression is
government religious speech. Should the Supreme Court find (contrary to the circuit
court) that the expression is government religious speech, then the case will be
remanded to the lower court to consider, as a matter of first impression, whether the
199
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Justice Alito announced the judgment of the Court in Hein
and delivered an opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Kennedy.3 In this controlling opinion,4 Justice Alito said
federal taxpayers lacked standing to pursue a claim that certain
discretionary actions by executive branch officials were in
violation of the Establishment Clause.5 The officials sued were
members of the staff working on President George W. Bush's
faith-based initiative.' These officials were staging conferences
throughout the country that were alleged by plaintiffs to
promote the initiative in a manner that favored religious over
secular social service providers. The conferences were not
specifically authorized by Congress, but were paid from monies
appropriated for the normal operating expenses of the Executive
Office of the President (hereinafter EOP).7 Either President
Bush or a cabinet secretary would keynote these conferences,
and the plaintiffs (although not personally present) further
complained that conference speeches included remarks that
endorsed religion or theism over nonreligion or atheism.' The
speech violates the Establishment Clause. Accordingly, the question before the High
Court in Pleasant Grove does not call for a decision concerning an alleged violation of the
Establishment Clause. For more about the proceedings below, see Summum v. Pleasant
Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007), petitions for reh'g and reh'g en banc denied,
499 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).
3 127 S. Ct. at 2559.
4 When the Supreme Court fails to issue a majority opinion, the opinion of the
members who concur in the judgment on the narrowest grounds is controlling. Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). Soon after Hein was handed down, there was
debate about whether Justice Alito's plurality or Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion
was on the narrowest grounds and thus the controlling opinion. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu &
Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. and
the Future of Establishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 BYU L. REV. 115, 130 (2008).
However, there is little to no difference between the two opinions in either substance or
tone. They are nowhere inconsistent. Justice Kennedy wrote separately to illustrate
additional ways in which extending taxpayer standing to the facts in Hein would be
harmful to the doctrine of separation of powers. The lower federal courts will almost
certainly draw upon and follow both opinions, with Justice Alito's plurality being
regarded as controlling.
6 The Establishment Clause provides as follows: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2560 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2566.
s Id. at 2559-61.
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plaintiffs were the Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc.
(hereinafter FFRF) and three of its members. Located in
Madison, Wisconsin, FFRF is a nonprofit public-interest
organization of agnostics and atheists dedicated to a strict
separation of church and state.9
Justice Kennedy fully joined the plurality but filed a
concurring opinion.1" Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring
in the judgment, which was joined by Justice Thomas.1" Justice
Souter filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. 2 Thus the split was 3-2-4, with
five Justices voting to reverse the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.13
The 1968 decision of Flast v. Cohen14 was the first occasion
for the Supreme Court to permit taxpayer standing, but two
conditions had to be met. 5 In Hein, Justice Alito said that Flast
9 Information about FFRF is available at its website, http://www.ffrf.org/purposes.
10 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
11 Id. at 2573 (Scalia, J., concurring).
12 Id. at 2584 (Souter, J., dissenting).
13 A divided panel of the Seventh Circuit had earlier held that plaintiffs had
standing to sue as federal taxpayers. Freedom From Religion Found. v. Chao, 433 F.3d
989 (7th Cir. 2006), rev'd sub nom. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 127 S. Ct.
2553 (2007). The panel's majority opinion was written by a jurist of note, Judge Richard
Posner. A petition for rehearing en banc was denied by a vote of seven to four. Freedom
From Religion Found. v. Chao, 447 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2006). An opinion concurring in
the denial of a rehearing was written by another prominent jurist, Judge Frank
Easterbrook, who urged the Supreme Court to grant a review of the matter and clear up
the "arbitrariness ... built into the doctrine" of taxpayer standing. Id. at 990.
14 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
15 In what has come to be called the "double-nexus test," Flast said that taxpayer
standing was allowed if the following test was satisfied. "First, the taxpayer must
establish a logical link between [taxpayer] status and the type of legislative enactment
attacked .... Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between [taxpayer] status
and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged." Id. at 102. Between
Flast and Hein, two Supreme Court cases examined assertions of taxpayer standing
where the underlying claim on the merits was brought under the Establishment Clause.
In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982), the Court held that taxpayers lacked standing to challenge a
decision by a federal executive agency to declare certain government-owned real estate
as surplus and then transfer the real estate free of charge under the Property Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, to a Christian college. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 466-69.
Flast permitted taxpayer standing only when the taxpayer-plaintiff was challenging
Congress' use of its Taxing and Spending Power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Valley
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should be applied according to its terms, but its scope is not to
be expanded to the facts presently before the Court.'6 The Court
in Flast permitted taxpayer standing for an Establishment
Clause challenge to an exercise by Congress of its taxing and
spending power. 17 Justice Alito wrote in Hein that for there to
be federal taxpayer standing a plaintiff must challenge
expenditures "funded by a specific congressional appropriation"
and disbursed in support of religion "pursuant to a direct and
unambiguous congressional mandate.' The Flast test did not
fit the situation in Hein because, in Justice Alito's view, "[t]hese
appropriations [to the EOP] did not expressly authorize, direct,
or even mention the [faith-based initiative] expenditures of
which [plaintiffs] complain."' 9 Rather, FFRF's challenge was to
how officials within the Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives were exerting their efforts and using EOP financial
resources to stage faith-based conferences in pursuit of the
President's policy initiative. In short, executive branch officials
were said to be unconstitutionally promoting the work of faith-
based social service providers over secular providers, and to be
otherwise endorsing religion.2" Such activity was not
attributable to Congress.2'
Seven of the Justices in Hein said that they will continue to
apply the Flast test for taxpayer standing.22 A somewhat
Forge, 454 U.S. at 478-82. In Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), the Court held
that taxpayer-plaintiffs had standing to challenge a congressional social service program
that provided grant funding to secular and religious counseling centers promoting teen
chastity. Id. at 618-20. The Court went on to uphold the constitutionality of the
program on its face, but remanded for further proceedings with respect to "as applied"
challenges. Id. at 600-18, 620-22.
16 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2565-68, 2571-72 (plurality opinion).
17 The Taxing and Spending Clause provides in relevant part: "The Congress shall
have the Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
18 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2565 (plurality opinion).
19 Id. at 2566.
20 Id. at 2561.
21 Id. at 2566.
22 Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Alito would continue to apply Flast. See id. at 2568; see also id. at 2587-88
(Souter, J., dissenting).
[VOL. 78.1202
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different group of five Justices would not expand the scope of
Flast.2 3 Justices Scalia and Thomas would overrule Flast and
never permit taxpayer standing.24
While the matter directly at hand is the scope of taxpayer
standing first permitted in Flast, this extended essay uses the
"injury in fact" requirement for standing to delve into the
manner by which the four opinions in Hein give insight into how
the Roberts Court approaches the Establishment Clause and
hence the judiciary's role in policing government support for
religion. The essay also demonstrates how a "generalized
grievance," for which standing is generally denied, necessarily
involves a claim where a structural clause of the Constitution is
said to be violated rather than a rights-based claim. The above
questions are all the more interesting because Hein is the first
church-state case to come before the Supreme Court since the
two newest Justices, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito,
were appointed. Getting to those questions requires that we
first examine the nature of standing, the subject of Part I.
I. STANDING TO SUE
Standing is a doctrine of justiciability derived from the
Cases or Controversies Clause in Article III of the
Constitution. 25 It implicates separation of powers in the sense of
being a limit on the federal judiciary's subject matter
jurisdiction. Standing has three requirements: "injury in fact,"
causation, and redressability.26 "Injury in fact" means that the
plaintiff has suffered some actual or imminent harm. 2
7
23 Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito
would not expand Flast. See id. at 2568 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 2584 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
24 See id. at 2573-74, 2584 (Scalia, J., concurring).
25 The Constitution provides in relevant part: 'The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under [federal law, and] - to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a Party; - to Controversies between two or more States; [and
to certain other cases]." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
26 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-62 (1992) (holding, inter alia,
that a congressional grant of standing to all U.S. citizens to challenge certain regulatory
actions was unconstitutional).
27 Id. at 560.
20081
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Causation means that the harm is fairly traceable to the
defendant.28 Finally, redressability means that the harm can be
redressed by a remedy traditionally known to Anglo-American
courts of law and equity.29
Just because the United States Constitution is alleged to be
violated does not give a plaintiff standing to sue. Rather, the
complainant must be someone who is specifically injured by the
putative violation 0  A claim that the government is not
following the Constitution, without more, is what the Supreme
Court calls a "generalized grievance." A "generalized grievance"
is one suffered by the entire body politic when the government
does not follow the law. A "generalized grievant" is thus without
standing because he or she is without concrete injury. It is not a
numbers game. That is, it is not that the plaintiff lacks
standing because many others also suffer the same injury.31
Rather, it is that the judicial branch has no jurisdiction to hear a
claim that the government is violating the law without the
complainant having some specific injury attributable to the
alleged violation. How is it that the Constitution can be violated
and yet no one is individually harmed? That is the subject of
Part II.
II. GENERALIZED GRIEVANCES
The United States Constitution is composed of rights and
structure. Rights vest in people, as well as the organizations
they form. Structure is usefully envisioned as the
28 Id.
29 See id. at 560-61.
30 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). In Valley Forge, the Court stated:
Although [plaintiffs] claim that the Constitution has been violated, they claim
nothing else. They fail to identify any personal injury suffered by [plaintiffs]
as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the
psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with
which one disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under
Art. III, even though the disagreement is phrased in constitutional terms.
Id. at 485-86.
31 See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-25 (1998) (stating that a
"generalized grievance" lacks the necessary concreteness, not because the alleged injury
is widespread, but because of the abstract nature of the asserted interest or injury).
204 [VOL. 78.1
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organizational framework of the national government, which is
that of a federal republic.
The presence of a "generalized grievance" never occurs
when a plaintiffs claim is that an individual constitutional right
has been violated by the government. Rights violations always
produce a victim. This is because rights run in favor of people.
Thus, when a right is violated, there is always someone or some
group that is specifically harmed. And this individualized harm
satisfies the "injury in fact" requirement for standing. Of
course, the victim may choose to waive his or her constitutional
rights and just quietly suffer the harm. However, if the right is
not waived but asserted, it cannot be said that the harmed
plaintiff has no standing to sue because the claim is a
"generalized grievance."
This is not the situation with respect to a violation of a
structural clause in the United States Constitution. The nature
of a structural clause speaks to the government's powers and
duties. The national government is one of limited, delegated
powers.32 There are checks and balances running between and
among the three branches. These limits on power are structural
in nature, and the checks run against the government or the
branches and officials thereof. These limits or checks on the
power of the various branches of the government yield
individual liberty, but this liberty comes only as a consequence
of the structural clauses working to check and balance the power
of the government's various branches and officials. Accordingly,
sometimes (not always) structure can be violated but no person
or organization suffers a concrete injury; that is, there is no
individualized "injury in fact." When this occurs, no person or
group has standing to sue. Instead, there is a "generalized
grievance."
Ex parte Levitt33 is an early example of a structural
violation where no one was specifically injured, so no one had
32 This was implicit in the Constitution of 1787. It was then made explicit in the
Tenth Amendment, which provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
- 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam).
20081
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standing to sue. The case involved President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's appointment of Justice Hugo Black to the United
States Supreme Court. Albert Levitt, in his capacity as a citizen
and as a member of the Supreme Court's bar, petitioned the
Court to delay the appointment because, when nominated, Hugo
Black was a member of the United States Senate. Congress had
recently voted to increase the retirement benefits of members of
the Supreme Court. Albert Levitt argued that the
Appointments Clause 34 prohibits a member of Congress from
immediately assuming an appointment in the judicial branch
when, during the member's elected term, "the Emoluments" of
the office were increased via retirement benefits for the Court's
Justices. The purpose of this structural clause is a good one,
namely, to prevent members of Congress from using their offices
for personal financial gain. And Albert Levitt's claim that the
Constitution was violated certainly appeared to have some
merit. Instead of reaching the merits, however, the Supreme
Court dismissed for lack of standing.35 The Court said that to
invoke its jurisdiction a petitioner "must show that he has
sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, a direct
injury as the result of that action[,] and it is not sufficient that
he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public."36 Albert Levitt was a "generalized grievant."
Similarly, in United States v. Richardson,37 the Court
denied standing to a plaintiff who claimed the Account Clause 38
required Congress to disclose the appropriation of all public
monies. The purpose of this structural clause is also a good one
because it compels Congress to be transparent in how public
funds are appropriated. The plaintiff sought disclosure of the
3 The Appointments Clause provides in relevant part: "No Senator or
Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil
Office under the Authority of the United States ... the Emoluments whereof shall have
been encreased during such time . U. " .S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
35 302 U.S. at 634.
s6 Id.
37 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
38 The Account Clause provides in relevant part: "[A] regular Statement and
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from
time to time." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
[VOL. 78.1
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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) budget, which, if brought to
light, would have revealed covert operations and other state
secrets.39  Although the government ostensibly violated a
structural duty by classifying as secret all appropriations to the
CIA, no one suffered a concrete injury. The absence of a
personalized injury required dismissal for lack of standing.4 °
Richardson's assertions of standing both as a citizen and as a
taxpayer were rejected, 41 and the claim was dismissed as a
"generalized grievance."
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War42 was
decided the same day as Richardson. Plaintiffs claimed that
members of Congress who also drew pay as reserve officers in
the armed forces violated a structural clause prohibiting
members of Congress from simultaneously holding positions in
the executive branch.43  The structural clause is a good one,
seeking to prevent conflicts of interest when members of
Congress have divided loyalties because they also hold paid jobs
in the executive branch. But no one was specifically injured as a
result of the ostensible violation, so again the Supreme Court
dismissed the matter because it was a "generalized grievance."44
Levitt, Richardson, and Schlesinger illustrate well the idea
of a "generalized grievance." A rights violation will always
produce a victim, and thereby a person or organization with
individualized "injury in fact." That is not the case with a
violation of a structural clause. It necessarily follows that when
a "generalized grievance" occurs, the nature of the constitutional
clause alleged to be violated is structural as opposed to rights-
based. This has implications for the Roberts Court and its view
of the Establishment Clause, as will become evident in Parts III
and IV.
39 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175 & n.8.
40 Id. at 180.
41 Id. at 176-80.
42 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
43 The Constitution provides in relevant part: "[N]o Person holding any Office under
the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
44 Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 216-27.
2008]
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III. THE RULE AGAINST TAXPAYER STANDING AND FLASrS
EXCEPTION
The general rule is that there is no standing to sue as a
federal taxpayer when alleging a violation of the United States
Constitution.4 5 When one sues asserting taxpayer standing, the
plaintiff is not asking for a portion of his or her taxes to be
lowered or refunded. Nor is the focus of the plaintiff on the
lawfulness of the tax. Rather, the focus is on some generalized
constitutional violation that the plaintiff wants stopped.
However, for a federal court to enjoin the alleged constitutional
violation the plaintiff must first have standing to sue; hence, one
must have "injury in fact." The complaint is a "generalized
grievance."46
In 1968, the Court handed down Flast v. Cohen,47 which
made an exception to the foregoing rule. At issue in Flast was
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,48 a
provision of which provided federal funding to nonpublic schools
for educational equipment, as well as for classes in reading and
arithmetic.4 9 Funding was available to K-12 nonpublic schools
without regard to possible religious affiliation. Insofar as
funding was made available to religious and religiously
affiliated schools, plaintiffs sued under the Establishment
Clause alleging a violation of church-state separation.50
45 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Of course, the rule against
taxpayer standing does not apply to situations where the claimant is suing as a taxpayer
because she is due a tax refund or because she is the victim of an illegal tax. In these
latter instances, there is individualized "injury in fact."
46 Justice Alito said as much in Hein when he wrote that "if every federal taxpayer
could sue to challenge any Government expenditure, the federal courts would cease to
function as courts of law and would be cast in the role of general complaint bureaus."
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2559 (2007) (plurality opinion).
47 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
48 Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.).
49 Fast, 392 U.S. at 85-86.
50 Id. at 85-88. The plaintiffs in Flast also brought a claim under the Free Exercise
Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. I. Flast, 392 U.S. at 85, 103. However, in remanding for
further proceedings, the Court only permitted the taxpayer-plaintiffs to proceed with
their claim under the Establishment Clause. Id. at 103-05. That makes sense. The Free
Exercise Clause is rights.based. If there was a rights violation, there would be a victim,
[VOL. 78.1
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Plaintiffs were not individually harmed by the federal funding.
Rather, they remained at liberty to exercise their own religion (if
they had one), as well as any other constitutional right they
might have. They had no specific "injury in fact" and thus no
standing to sue. Indeed, no one had "injury in fact." For
example, the public schools were not harmed. Just because
some religious schools were funded did not mean that public
schools would get less money; government aid to education is not
a zero sum game. And nonpublic schools receiving federal
funding were not harmed because the funding was optional; no
nonpublic school was being forced to take the government aid.
Because plaintiffs had no specific harm, the complainants in
Flast sued in their capacity as federal taxpayers.51
Following longstanding precedent, the lower federal courts
dismissed for lack of standing. 52 The Supreme Court reversed.
The plaintiffs in Flast sought no tax refund or reduction in their
taxes, thus tax money was not their "injury in fact."53 Rather,
the plaintiffs' alleged injury was that the government's money
went in support of religion, a "generalized grievance." So the
Court adopted a legal fiction. The fiction is that every taxpayer
has an individualized interest, vested in the Establishment
Clause understood as a power-denying restraint on
congressional appropriations being directed in aid of religion.54
When Flast permitted taxpayer standing the claim on the
and thereby a plaintiff with "injury in fact" and standing to sue. Taxpayer standing is
never needed for claims under the Free Exercise Clause. For this reason, the Court has
twice rejected taxpayer standing claims brought under the Free Exercise Clause. See
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (federal taxpayers lacked the requisite
burden on religion to pursue free exercise claim); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
248-49 (1968) (same holding with respect to state taxpayers).
51 Flast, 392 U.S. at 85, 88.
52 Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (1967), rev'd sub nom. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968).
53 Flast, 392 U.S. at 85-88.
54 Id. at 105 ("We have noted that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
does specifically limit the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I, § 8."). The
Flast Court had earlier characterized the Establishment Clause as, inter alia, having
two purposes, the second being implicated here: "Our history vividly illustrates that one
of the specific evils feared by those who drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for
its adoption was that the taxing and spending power would be used to favor one religion
over another or to support religion in general." Id. at 103.
2008]
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merits was not that the plaintiffs were individually coerced
against their religious conscience to pay taxes to support the
religion of others-for that would be attempting to assert a
rights-based violation where the Supreme Court has
consistently ruled that there is no such right.5 5  Rather,
damages in the form of an indeterminate (and surely de
minimis) amount of taxes paid are a surrogate in Flast for what
is otherwise a "generalized grievance" caused by an improper
relationship between church and state (here, a relationship in
the form of the government funding K-12 religious schools).
Taxpayer standing under Flast is not characterized as a
legal fiction to disparage the case. Nor is it called a fiction
because Flast over-reads the Establishment Clause. Rather,
Flast standing is called a legal fiction simply as an apt
description. Indeed, Justice Alito candidly acknowledged the
fiction, stating in Hein that "[i]n light of the size of the federal
budget, it is a complete fiction to argue that an unconstitutional
federal expenditure causes an individual federal taxpayer any
measurable economic harm."56
55 The Court has taken up a violation-of-conscience claim brought under the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses and rejected both of them. The plaintiffs in Flast
claimed that payment of a general federal tax, the monies of which were appropriated to
religious schools, was religious coercion in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Flast,
392 U.S. at 103, 104 n.25. The Court chose to defer deciding whether that averment
stated a claim, and declined to decide whether a federal taxpayer even had standing to
raise such a claim. In Tilton, the Court returned to the issue and held that a federal
taxpayer's claim of religious coercion did not state a claim for which relief can be granted
under the Free Exercise Clause. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971). See also
supra note 50. In Valley Forge, claimants challenged the transfer of government
property at no charge to a religious college as violative of the Establishment Clause.
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S.
464 (1982). Several asserted bases for standing were unsuccessful because claimants
lacked the requisite "injury in fact." Id. One of the rejected bases was that claimants
had a "spiritual stake" in not having their government give away property for a religious
purpose or to act in any other way contrary to no-establishment values. The Court held
that a "spiritual stake" in having one's government comply with the Establishment
Clause is not a cognizable injury. Id. at 486 n.22.
66 Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2559 (2007) (plurality
opinion). See also Louis Henkin, Forward: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 74
(1968) ("And it is a fiction that a taxpayer like Flast is asserting a personal stake or
interest based on his reluctance to have his tax money expended for the purpose to which
he objects.").
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Flast's adoption of the legal fiction of taxpayer standing
permitted the Supreme Court to reach the merits in the absence
of a complainant suffering specific "injury in fact" or actual
harm. This is unique, for no claim on the merits other than one
brought under the Establishment Clause has ever been
permitted in a federal court by a plaintiff asserting taxpayer
standing." Referencing the period 1776-1786 when the State of
Virginia disestablished the Anglican Church,5" the Flast Court
said that the "concern of [James] Madison and his [Virginia]
supporters was quite clearly that religious liberty ultimately
would be the victim if government could employ its taxing and
spending powers" to directly aid religion.59 The principles
behind the Virginia disestablishment were then equated by the
Court in Flast with the meaning of the Establishment Clause.
And the meaning, in the Court's view, was that the
Establishment Clause was a restraint "designed as a specific
bulwark against such potential abuses of governmental power,
and that [the] clause ... operates as a specific constitutional
limitation upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and
spending power conferred by Art. I, § 8."' 0
In his dissent in Hein, Justice Souter characterized the
taxpayers' claim in Flast as "the protection of liberty of
57 See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568-69 (plurality opinion), 2587 n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(conceding that taxpayer standing has been recognized only in claims brought under the
Establishment Clause); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 347-49 (2006)
(denying taxpayer standing in complaint alleging a violation of the Dormant Commerce
Clause).
58 See THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA 1776-
1787, at 38-172 (1977); H. J. ECKENRODE, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN
VIRGINIA: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVOLUTION 74-115 (Da Capo Press
1971) (1910); CHARLES F. JAMES, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN VIRGINIA 68-141 (Da Capo Press 1971) (1900).
69 Fast, 392 U.S. at 103-04.
60 Id. at 104. This attribution of the ideas behind the Virginia experience of 1776-
1786 to the intended meaning of the Establishment Clause as drafted by the First
Congress in 1789, and its subsequent ratification by the states during 1789-1791, is
dubious as a matter of history. However, the Court in Flast was following a path the
Court had already traveled twenty years earlier in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
11-13 (1947). See Carl H. Esbeck, The 60th Anniversary of the Everson Decision and
America's Church-State Proposition, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 15, 17-26 (2007-2008).
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conscience,"61 whereas Justice Scalia characterized the plaintiffs'
claim as protection from "psychic injury."62 Both are wrong. A
taxpayer who is highly separationist on church-state matters is
no more "injured" in her conscience when general tax revenues
are appropriated from the public treasury to support religion
than is a racial minority "injured" when general tax revenues
are appropriated from the public treasury to support a white
segregationist academy. Yet, according to the Court, there is
standing in the former case brought under the Establishment
Clause but not in the latter case brought under the Equal
Protection Clause. This is not logical. That is because there is
no actual injury in Flast, and the sooner we all stop looking for it
the better off we will be. The logic of the Court's thinking in
Flast is to be found elsewhere, namely in the difference between
a claim brought under the modern Establishment Clause and a
rights-based claim such as one brought under the Equal
Protection Clause.
Like all legal fictions, the fiction in Flast was adopted for
instrumental purposes. If the Flast Court had not entertained
the fiction, legislative bodies everywhere (federal, state, and
local) could appropriate money for general aid-to-education
programs, allow religious schools to be equally eligible for the
programs, and no one will have standing to challenge the
programs as being in violation of the Establishment Clause. A
starker example would be Congress appropriating money to pay
the salaries of all religious ministers or clergy who applied for
the funds. Without taxpayer standing under Flast, no one would
have standing to challenge such a law in federal court which
surely strikes at the core of the American church-state
settlement.
Flast allowed the suit to go forward where there was a mere
"generalized grievance." Flast thus enabled a more expansive
judicial enforcement of the Establishment Clause. Indeed, after
Flast a complainant may also assert state or local taxpayer
61 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2585 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711 n.22 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
62 Id. at 2574 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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standing in order to pursue a claim that the Establishment
Clause is violated.6 3 This follows because what matters with the
legal fiction in Flast is not the particular government
promulgating the tax, but that the claim on the merits is a
legislative appropriation said to be in violation of the
Establishment Clause. On the other hand, by allowing the legal
fiction, the Court in Flast weakened the requirement of standing
to sue, which in turn weakened the doctrine of separation of
powers. 64  It was a trade-off.65  The Flast Court believed that
there was a compelling need for such a trade-off, and this tells
us something very important about the character of the modern
Establishment Clause, the subject of Part IV.
IV. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IS REGARDED AS STRUCTURAL
IN NATURE
How is it that there can be a colorable claim that the
Establishment Clause is violated but no one is harmed? If the
Supreme Court regards the modern Establishment Clause as
structural, then we know that structural violations can occur,
and yet the complainant is a "generalized grievant." Because
the Court deems the fiction of taxpayer standing as necessary in
63 Compare Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (rejecting assertion of
state taxpayer standing to challenge a state law authorizing devotional Bible reading in
public schools because "the grievance which [the plaintiff] sought to litigate [i.e., their
unwanted exposure to the Bible reading] . . . is not a direct dollars-and-cents injury [to a
taxpayer] but is a religious difference."), with Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 380 n.5
(1985) (collecting cases in which state taxpayer standing was allowed).
64 When F/ast permits state or local government taxpayer standing the trade-off is
not with the doctrine of separation of powers but with federalism. That is, federal court
jurisdiction results in judicial intervention into the affairs of legislative bodies at the
state and local level. Justice Kennedy noted this in Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2573 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) ('The Court has refused to establish a constitutional rule that would
require or allow 'permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental
operations to a degree inconsistent with sound principles of federalism and the
separation of powers."' (emphasis added) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423
(2006)).
6 In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy was candid about this trade-off in
F/ast: 'The Court's decision in Flast and in later cases applying it, must be interpreted
as respecting separation-of-powers principles but acknowledging as well that these
principles, in some cases, must accommodate the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause." Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
HeinOnline  -- 78 Miss. L.J. 213 2008-2009
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 78.1
certain claims under the Establishment Clause, it follows that
the Court regards the modern Establishment Clause as
structural (or jurisdictional) in its nature and operation-that is,
the clause is about the separation of church and government.
Since Everson v. Board of Education,66 the Supreme Court
has read the Establishment Clause as embodying a particular
understanding of the separation of church and state. In the
first half of the nineteenth century the principle was called (and
spelled) "voluntaryism."68 Voluntaryism means religion is to be
supported voluntarily, if at all, by those in the private sector-
which is to say, not affirmatively supported by government.
Voluntaryism goes well beyond prohibiting attempts by the
government to force religious belief on individuals or to coerce
religiously informed conscience. Voluntaryism is about rejecting
government support for religion, whether or not that support
results in coercion of conscience. 69  Voluntaryism is also about
protecting organized religion from government interference.
Hence, church-state separation-rightly understood-is
reciprocal. The proper ordering of church-state relations is to
the mutual benefit of both the body politic and organized
- 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (holding, inter alia, the Establishment Clause is applicable
to state and local governments via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
67 See Esbeck, supra note 60, at 20-27.
68 The state-by-state disestablishment of the Anglican Church in the American
South and later the Congregational Church in New England, along with the emergence
of voluntaryism during the early national period, 1776-1830s, is surveyed in Carl H.
Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early
American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1448-1540.
69 To be sure, coerced religious belief or observance is a violation of conscience. But
such coercion is generally a matter for the Free Exercise Clause. Relieving religious
coercion is a rights function. That is not what the Court's post-Everson Establishment
Clause is about. Rather, the modern Establishment Clause is about patrolling the
boundary between church and state. That is a structural function. This understanding
is reflected in the Supreme Court's cases that distinguish the modern Establishment
Clause from the Free Exercise Clause on the basis that the no-establishment principle
(unlike free exercise) does not require a showing of coercion of religion-based conscience
or other religious harm. See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221 (1963) ("The
Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any
showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws
which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-
observing individuals or not." (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962))).
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religion. Statements observing this mutuality are common in
Supreme Court opinions.7 °
The separation of church and state is, by its nature, a
structural relationship.71 Its operation is roughly parallel to the
Constitution's structural relationship among the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches-which we call separation of
powers. The task of the post-Everson Establishment Clause is to
police the boundary between government and organized religion,
thereby keeping these two centers of authority in their proper
role or relationship to each other. This is also why legislative
appropriations can be thought to undermine the principle of no-
establishment-like the federal education payments to religious
K-12 schools at issue in Flast-yet there is no individual or
organization with "injury in fact," and thus no one with
traditional standing to sue.
This is not to say that there is never individuated "injury in
fact" when the Establishment Clause is violated. Sometimes
there is. On occasion, the Establishment Clause has provided
redress for individual harms: economic harm or loss of
property;72 constraints on academic freedom and inquiry by
70 See, e.g., Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) ("For the
First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best
work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective
sphere."); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730 (1871) ("The structure of our
government has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions
from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the
invasion of the civil authority.").
71 That the Supreme Court has regarded the modern Establishment Clause as
ordering relations between church and state is manifest in the Court's case law, not just
in reduced-rigor standing rules but in several additional ways. See Carl H. Esbeck, The
Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint: Validations and Ramifications, 18 J.L.
& POL. 445, 456-71 (2002) (discussing relaxed standing rules; remedies for non-religious'
harm and class-wide remedies, not just relief for the claimants before the court;
dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; two definitions of religion, one for the
Free Exercise Clause and one for the Establishment Clause, reflecting the different
purposes of each clause; and remedies that protect organized religion from its own
harmful choices). If Hein had overruled Past, the treatment of the Establishment
Clause as structural would still be validated by these other features in the Court's case
law.
72 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (economic harm to
department store); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (economic harm to
a tavern).
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teachers and students;73 restraints on free-thinking atheists; 74
and unwanted exposure to government-sponsored religious
expression. 75  The same is true with structural violations
generally: sometimes there are persons with "injury in fact," but
not always. However, the complaint in Flast was an example of
an alleged structural violation where no one was individually
harmed, and thus no one had traditional standing to sue.76 So is
73 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (public school teacher and students
desirous of an expanded science curriculum); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
(same).
74 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (ruling in favor of atheist, who by self-
profession had no religion and thus no harm to his religion, but who was desirous of
holding public office without taking theistic oath).
75 In the case of government-sponsored religious symbols and other government
religious expression, the Establishment Clause protects those necessarily exposed to the
unwanted expression. In these unwanted exposure-to-religion cases, the Supreme Court
has a reduced-rigor standing requirement. The requisite "injury in fact" for standing is
lowered, albeit not eliminated altogether as in Flast. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Washburn
Univ., 416 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1003 (2006); Robinson v.
City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1201 (1996). In
Robinson, the circuit court permitted the claimant standing to challenge, under the
Establishment Clause, a city seal that included a Latin cross. 68 F.3d at 1230 n.6. The
plaintiff averred that he lived and worked in the city but did not allege that he was
directly exposed to the seal on a regular basis. Id. at 1228. Three of the Court's Justices
dissented from the denial of certiorari, noting a split in the circuits concerning how much
unwanted exposure to a religious symbol was required for standing to raise a no-
establishment claim. Robinson, 517 U.S. at 1202-03 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined
by Scalia and Thomas, JJ.) (collecting authorities from the circuits, a majority of which
permit standing, without more, upon direct but unwanted exposure to the religious
symbol in question). In O'Connor, the circuit court granted standing to a student and a
professor both of whom had to regularly walk by an offending statue on the university's
campus. 416 F.3d at 1222-23. The reduced-rigor standing in exposure-to-religion cases is
additional evidence that the Court regards the Establishment Clause as structural.
There is now concern by some commentators that Hein will embolden government
lawyers and judges to challenge reduced-rigor standing. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note
4, at 162-63.
76 Flast showed just how determined the post-Everson Court was to enforce
voluntaryism. Even now we see the logic of voluntaryism being pressed with respect to
government displays of the Ten Commandments and the "under God" language in the
Pledge of Allegiance. Compare McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding
that recent depiction of the Ten Commandments in a county building display violates
Establishment Clause), with Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion)
(determining that a stone monument on the grounds of a state capitol building depicting
the Ten Commandments that had been in place for several years did not violate the
Establishment Clause); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1
(2004) (holding that plaintiff did not have standing to maintain a claim that voluntary
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the complaint in Hein. What we should make of the Hein
decision is taken up in Part V.
V. WHAT TO MAKE OF THE HOLDING IN HEIN?
The decision in Flast worked to undermine the doctrine of
separation of powers.77 It gave federal courts jurisdiction to pass
on the merits of a church-state claim where there was no actual
standing to sue, that is, no case or controversy. On the other
hand, Flast enabled broader judicial enforcement of the modern
Establishment Clause, which since Everson the Court has read
to be the policing of the boundary between church and state-a
structural relationship by its nature.
The fiction of taxpayer standing in Flast can be justified
because the proper structuring of church and state intrinsic to
the modern Establishment Clause is sui generis, that is, it is
unlike other constitutional structures which either run
horizontally between the three federal branches (separation of
powers) or vertically between the federal government and the
governments of the several states (federalism). When either
separation of powers or federalism is transgressed, there will be
some other government branch eager to defend against the
encroachment on its turf. This is not so with violations of
church-state separation, especially those involving the
appropriation of large sums of money from the public treasury.
A religious organization receiving a grant out of general tax
revenues (and potentially entangling funding regulations that
public school student recitation of "under God" in Pledge of Allegiance violates the
Establishment Clause).
77 In Hein, Justice Alito took care to link traditional standing back to its roots in
separation of powers:
[Expanding Flast] would also raise serious separation-of-powers concerns. As
we have recognized, Flast itself gave too little weight to these concerns. By
framing the standing question solely in terms of whether the dispute would be
presented in an adversary context and in a form traditionally viewed as
capable of judicial resolution, Flast "failed to recognize that this doctrine has a
separation-of-powers component, which keep courts within certain traditional
bounds vis-A-vis the other branches, concrete adverseness or not." [Plaintiffs']
position, if adopted, would repeat and compound this mistake.
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2569-70 (2007) (plurality
opinion) (citations omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 n.3 (1996)).
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may compromise the autonomy of the religious organization) is
not going to complain about the funding or the accompanying
regulatory entanglement. This is because the receipt of the
funds is voluntary. In Flast, of course, the religious
organizations in question were religious K-12 schools, and such
schools will not complain about receiving the grant monies or
the burden of complying with the accompanying regulations. If
the regulations became unbearable or compromised the
autonomy of the religious school, then the school would simply
refuse the funding. Such behavior is to be expected of any
private-sector organization, religious or nonreligious, awarded
scarce government funding.
The Court in Hein had before it a choice. The Court could
have expanded Flast standing, and thus enhanced the Court's
role in policing the structural relationship between church and
state. Or the Court could have reversed Flast, and thus restored
matters to a traditional view of standing, one which checks
federal judicial power and thereby buttresses the doctrine of
separation of powers. Both the proper structuring of church-
state relations and the faithful adherence to traditional
separation of powers are high-value constitutional principles.
Either the Court makes a purist's choice between one principle
or the other, or the Court is willing to operate in the realm of
logical inconsistency in pursuit of deriving some benefit from
both purist positions.
In Hein, the three-Justice plurality chose neither purist
position. It steered the middle road of not overruling Flast but
also not expanding Flast. While not undoing the past, Justice
Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, was
clear about not wanting to do more damage to the doctrine of
separation of powers:
The rule [plaintiffs] propose would enlist the federal courts to
superintend, at the behest of any federal taxpayer, the
speeches, statements, and myriad daily activities of the
President, his staff, and other Executive Branch officials. This
would... "open the Judiciary to an arguable charge of
providing 'government by injunction[.]"' It would deputize
federal courts as 'virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom
[VOL. 78.1
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and soundness of Executive action,"' ....78
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion is even more
forthcoming concerning the danger of expanding taxpayer
standing to the facts in Hein.79 He said that taxpayer standing
should not be extended to situations where congressionally
authorized discretionary spending is performed by agencies or
officers of the executive branch. 0 In one sense, everything said
or done by an agency or officer of the executive branch is made
possible only by the expenditure of taxpayer monies for salaries
and other general operations. If the judicial branch were to
review all such executive branch actions with an eye to church-
state boundary transgressions, then the Article III branch would
be superintending the day-to-day work of the Article II branch."
As stated above, the legal fiction of Flast taxpayer standing
is instrumental. Legal fictions seek to do more good than harm.
Flast had apparently delivered on that promise, for in Hein the
United States Solicitor General did not argue that the work and
independence of the legislative branch had been impeded by the
many lawsuits made possible only by the fiction in Flast. But if
all executive branch utterances and actions were judicially
reviewable in a search for church-state boundary violations-
and at the behest of hundreds of millions of taxpayers, federal,
state, and local-then we would have a clear case of doing more
harm than good.
As Justice Kennedy noted, the President of the United
States is elected to pursue certain policies favored by the
electorate. Vexatious litigation with its extensive discovery
requirements can easily derail policy initiatives.8 2 Given today's
7 Id. at 2570 (citations omitted).
79 Id. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80 Id. at 2572-73.
81 Justice Kennedy wrote:
The Court should not authorize the constant intrusion upon the executive
realm that would result from granting taxpayer standing in the instant
case. . . .The separation-of-powers concerns implicated by intrusive judicial
regulation of day-to-day executive operations reinforce [Justice Alito's]
interpretation of Flast's framework.
Id. at 2573.
82 Justice Kennedy wrote:
2008]
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rough-and-tumble politics, a President's opponents would surely
use litigation to get their way, where earlier these same
opponents had failed to defeat the President at the ballot box.
To expand the scope of taxpayer standing beyond Flast is to risk
considerable harm to separation of powers, with the judicial
branch used as an offensive weapon by opponents of the
President. 3 That would be destroying the village in order to
save it.
Hein preserved but did not expand Flast. What this tells us
about the modern Establishment Clause from the perspective of
the two newest members of the Court is the subject of Part VI.
VI. WHAT DOES HEIN TELL Us ABOUT THE ROBERTS COURT AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE?
Led by Justice Souter, the four dissenting Justices
evidenced strong backing for an Establishment Clause
The Executive Branch should be free, as a general matter, to discover new
ideas, to understand pressing public demands, and to find creative responses to
address governmental concerns. The exchange of ideas between and among
the State and Federal Governments and their manifold, diverse constituencies
sustains a free society. Permitting any and all taxpayers to challenge the
content of these prototypical executive operations and dialogues would lead to
judicial intervention so far exceeding traditional boundaries on the Judiciary
that there would arise a real danger of judicial oversight of executive duties.
The burden of discovery to ascertain if relief is justified in these potentially
innumerable cases would risk altering the free exchange of ideas and
information. And were this constant supervision to take place the courts would
soon assume the role of speech editors for communications issued by executive
officials and event planners for meetings they hold.
Id. at 2572-73.
83 Filed in Hein was Brief for Legal and Religious Historians and [Certain Named]
Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Hein v. Freedom From
Religion Found., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (No. 06-157), 2007 WL 320997. The brief amici
makes the point that for the American founders, the King of England as much as
Parliament made use of an established church to abuse the religious freedom of
dissenters. Id. at *5-8. Assuming this historical claim is true, it nonetheless misses the
concern that drives the controlling plurality in Hein. In the view of the plurality, to
extend Flast standing to discretionary actions by officials in the executive branch would
do major damage to the doctrine of separation of powers. Flast adopted the legal fiction
that legislative appropriations caused "injury in fact" to the proper ordering of church-
state separation. The fiction is a surrogate to permit the justiciability of Establishment
Clause claims while doing minimal damage to separation of powers. But the extension of
the legal fiction to discretionary executive spending-as amici urged-would come at too
high a price.
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understood as giving rise to a claim in every taxpayer to
conscientiously object to any aid to religion from general tax
revenues.8 4 This is consistent with their voting pattern on prior
no-establishment matters.8 5 The dissenters sought to expand
taxpayer standing, so that the federal courts could enforce the
post-Everson Establishment Clause in other circumstances. If
Flast had been extended to the facts in Hein, then hundreds of
millions of taxpayers (federal, state, and local) would have
standing to bring an Establishment Clause claim over public
funding of any and all character. That stance can only be
described as aggressive. As Justice Kennedy wrote in Hein, "[t]o
find standing in the circumstances of this case would make the
narrow exception [of Flast] boundless. 8 6
Contrariwise, the three Justices that comprise the plurality
were prepared to stay the course with Flast and, thus, continue
84 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2585-88 (Souter, J., dissenting).
'The judgment [in Flast] of sufficient injury takes account of the Madisonian
relationship of tax money and conscience, but it equally reflects the Founders'
pragmatic 'conviction that individual religious liberty could be achieved best
under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or
otherwise to assist any or all religions'....
Id. at 2587-88 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947)). For a critique of
Justice Souter's historical assertion that James Madison's position on church and state
supports the claim that every taxpayer has a right to conscientiously object to tax
revenues being appropriated to religious organizations, see Vincent Blasi, School
Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 789-91 (2002).
85 See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005) (Souter, J., for the
Court, joined by Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.) (holding that posting of
Ten Commandments as part of a larger historical display at two county courthouses had
the purpose of advancing religion and thus violated the Establishment Clause); Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 686 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.) (objecting to the majority opinion which upheld a school
voucher plan open to religious schools); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 867 (2000)
(Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ.) (objecting to the plurality
opinion which upheld direct federal aid to K-12 schools, including religious schools);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 863 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.) (objecting to majority opinion
which said that where a state university paid for printing expenses of student
newspapers, which payments partly defined the scope of a limited public forum to
enlarge student writing, the subsidy did not violate the Establishment Clause when
received by a student Christian newspaper).
86 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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the federal judiciary's middling to ambitious enforcement of the
modern Establishment Clause.17 This is a remarkable position
for Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. These two newest
Justices on the Court were faced with what for them must have
been a highly appealing argument in Hein, namely, that the
judiciary must carefully attend to its doctrines of justiciability
and not reach out to decide constitutional questions when the
Court's Article III jurisdiction is doubtful. Justice Scalia made
that argument in Hein.8  The Chief Justice and Justice Alito
were not only unconvinced, but they vigorously defended Flast's
application as doing useful work over its forty-year history.8 9
An alternative scenario is that Chief Justice Roberts sought
to steer the Court into ruling narrowly, so as to hand down a
five-Justice majority opinion.9" Such an opinion could not
overrule Flast if it was to retain Justice Kennedy's vote, for
Kennedy expressly said Flast was correctly decided.91 With that
as a given, for Justices Scalia and Thomas to join such a
majority opinion, the author would have had to say that the
Seventh Circuit should be reversed without overruling Flast-
thus leaving reconsideration of Flast for another day.92 But
Justices Scalia and Thomas were unwilling to leave Flast in
place, and they concurred separately. This scenario, however,
does not explain why, once it was clear that no majority opinion
was possible, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito did not
form a four-Justice plurality with Justices Scalia and Thomas
and state that they would expressly overrule Flast. Instead,
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito stayed with Justice
Kennedy, indicating they both sincerely believe the Court should
continue to adhere to Flast.
Some commentators have said Justice Alito's plurality
87 Id. at 2571-72 (plurality opinion).
88 Id. at 2573 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.).
89 Id. at 2565-69 (plurality opinion).
90 The virtue of the Supreme Court reaching a majority opinion is that it creates
more certainty as to the rule of law and hence more clarity for lawyers giving advice to
their clients, as well as less confusion among the lower federal and state courts.
9, Id. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In my view the result reached in F/ast is
correct and should not be called into question.").
92 Indeed, the plurality is just such an opinion.
[VOL. 78.1
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opinion strongly suggests Flast was wrongly decided" or was
being adhered to only out of stare decisis.94 That is not the case.
Justice Alito did not say Flast was wrongly decided or that it
must be followed out of duty to precedent. Justice Alito's only
criticism of Flast was unremarkable, in that he joined prior
opinions of the Court in noting that Flast did not give sufficient
weight to separation of powers.95 Perhaps the best evidence that
Justice Alito's plurality did not think the rule in Flast was
wrong is that the three Justices stayed the course in the face of
a withering attack by Justice Scalia. In any case, the plurality's
approach was that Flast from the outset proved to be a useful
but narrow exception to the rule against taxpayer standing and
that the Court's subsequent decisions have repeatedly turned
back attempts to broaden its scope.96
Justice Kennedy is equally interesting to observe in Hein.
When Justice O'Connor was on the Court, she and Justice
Kennedy were often the "swing votes" on social-issue cases.
They frequently took middle positions on the Establishment
Clause,97 but did not join one another's opinions.9 With a void
93 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 130 ("Alito strongly suggests that Fast was
wrong, but is not being overruled because a decision in the government's favor in Hein
does not require such overruling.").
94 Jesse Merriam, In Brief: Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, THE PEW
FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, June 12, 2008,
http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=305 ("Feeling bound by court precedent ... Alito was
unwilling to overrule Flast altogether.").
95 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2569 (plurality opinion).
96 Id. at 2568-69 (plurality opinion) ("It is significant that, in the four decades since
its creation, the Flast exception has largely been confined to its facts.").
97 Justices Kennedy and O'Connor often reached the same judgment in church-state
cases but one or both wrote or joined separate opinions. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 663 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (the majority opinion, which
both Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined, upheld K-12 school vouchers); Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 836 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (the plurality opinion, which
Justice Kennedy joined, upheld a federal aid program to K-12 schools, including religious
schools); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., for the Court, held that
prayer at public school commencement ceremony violated the Establishment Clause); id.
at 599 (Blackmun, J., concurring, joined by Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.); id. at 609
(Souter, J., concurring, joined by Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.); County of Allegheny v.
ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 623 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment, in Part II of which is joined by Brennan and
Stevens, JJ.); id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
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at the center left by the retirement of Justice O'Connor, there
was speculation that Justice Kennedy might move to occupy the
new "ideological middle" and thereby enhance his "swing vote"
power even more. Justice Kennedy, to his credit, did not do so in
Hein. His concurring opinion is consistent with his earlier
refusal to limit the substantive reach of the Establishment
Clause to cases where there is religious coercion.99
VII.CONCLUSION
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy, took a Goldilocks stance in Hein, in that the decision
was not too hot but not too cold. One would have to say that this
bodes well for those wanting little change in the Supreme
Court's current level of enforcement of the Establishment
Clause. Everson and Flast, as well as the three-Justice plurality
in Hein, implicitly recognize that the modern Establishment
in part, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Scalia, JJ.) (striking down municipal
Christmas nativity display as violative of the Establishment Clause, but upholding
Menorah as part of larger secular holiday display); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 622
(1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (upholding direct federal aid to teenage sexuality
counseling centers, including religious centers); id. at 624 (Kennedy, J., concurring,
joined by Scalia, J.).
98 For example, Justice Kennedy routinely votes to uphold religiously neutral
government aid programs having a secular purpose when some of the aid goes to
religious organizations. He was in the majority or part of the plurality in the following
cases: Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (holding that school voucher plan did not violate the
Establishment Clause); Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793 (holding that direct aid to K-12 schools,
including religious schools, does not violate the Establishment Clause); Bowen, 487 U.S.
589 (holding that direct aid to teen counseling centers, including religious centers, does
not violate Establishment Clause). Justice O'Connor also generally voted to uphold such
aid programs, but it was not uncommon for her to concur separately placing additional
qualifications on the aid or on the administration of the program. See Zelman, 536 U.S.
at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 836 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment, joined by Breyer, J.); Bowen, 487 U.S. at 622 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
9 In Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), Justice Kennedy for the majority held
that where prayers were part of a pubic school commencement exercise they were
unconstitutional. It did not matter that plaintiff-student's absence from the exercise
carried no penalty. A direct and unavoidable coercion of conscience need not be shown.
The optional nature of the exercise did not prevent a student and her parent from being
able to state a claim under the Establishment Clause. Id. at 586-89. Cf. id. at 631-32,
636-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting), calling Justice Kennedy's standard "a boundless test ... of
psychological coercion" and mere "peer.pressure coercion."
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Clause functions as a structural clause-keeping in proper order
two centers of authority, church and government. Beyond that,
it would over-read Hein to say that Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito have committed to any fixed view of church-state
relations-whether it is one allowing no financial aid for
pervasively religious organizations,100 permitting only indirect
aid to religious organizations, 0 1 or one that permits direct as
well as indirect aid to religious organizations, so long as the aid
is part of a larger program that administers the assistance on a
religion-neutral basis.10 2
Hein does mean, however, that public-interest
organizations with an ideological devotion to strict no-aid
separationism, organizations such as Freedom From Religion
Foundation, will continue to have taxpayer standing to litigate
their grievances with respect to legislative appropriations. And
this is true not only with respect to congressional
appropriations, but also appropriations at the state and local
level. Thus the courthouse door continues to remain open-but
only by halfl' 3-to bruising culture war litigation where the
claimant's only averred injury is abstract and ideological. 104
100 See Zelman, 536 U.S. 639, which upheld a school voucher plan as not in violation
of the Establishment Clause. Justice Souter dissented stating that he regards the
appropriations for vouchers for schooling, including religious schooling, as violative of
taxpayers' liberty of conscience. Id. at 711, 715 (Souter, J., dissenting). In his reading of
the history that gave rise to the Establishment Clause, not "three pence" in tax monies
were to make their way into the coffers of K-12 religious schools or other pervasively
religious organization. Id. at 711-16. See also supra note 84.
101 See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. 639, holding school voucher plan did not violate the
Establishment Clause because, inter alia, the plan directed the funds to the parents who
had free choice where to redeem their voucher. Id. at 651-56. This is often called
indirect funding because the government funds find their way to religious schools only
via the parents. It is also called beneficiary choice assistance.
102 In Mitchell, the four-Justice plurality said that it should not make any difference
whether the aid was paid by the government directly to the religious school or whether
the aid was paid to the parents of students who in turn freely choose to use the aid at a
religious school. 530 U.S. at 815-20. The former is often called direct funding. Id. at
816.
103 For a survey of taxpayer standing cases in the lower federal courts since Hein was
decided, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 138-51.
104 We can anticipate an increase in lawsuits by plaintiffs ideologically devoted to
strict church-state separationism asserting reduced-rigor standing based on claims of
unwanted exposure to religious expression attributable to the government. See supra
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note 75. These unwanted exposure claims are a variant on the role coercion can play in
an Establishment Clause violation. It is, however, a watered-down notion of coercion
more akin to the injury of being offended or made to feel like an outsider. See the
discussion of Lee v. Weisman, supra note 99. Although proof of coercion is not required
to make out a claim under the Establishment Clause (see supra note 69), religious
coercion may nonetheless be present. We can also anticipate an increase in lawsuits by
these same types of plaintiffs alleging discrimination among religions or religious
denominations. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (holding that state
regulatory legislation requiring only certain religious organizations to make reports
concerning their contributions and solicitation activities was a violation of the
Establishment Clause). Neither of these types of cases requires taxpayer standing, and
thus Hein does not apply.
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